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Nuno Vaz / Iris Cordelia Rotzoll 
 
Presidential elections in Guinea Bissau 2005 
 
A stabilizing factor in a fragile democracy or only a spot test 
of the state of affairs? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
n the hot afternoon of 7 April 2005 General João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira 
returned after six years of exile in Portugal to his native Guinea Bissau. 
Coming from Guinea Conakry, his helicopter landed at the 24 September Sta-
dium in the heart of the city of Bissau. The ex-president had governed Guinea 
Bissau for 19 years, from 1980 when he took power from Amilcar Cabral’s 
half-brother, Luis Cabral, until 1999 when he was forced to leave the country 
following the 1998-1999 civil war. Now he was greeted by thousands of sup-
porters and curious countrymen.  
 Just one day before, another ex-president’s announced intention to run in 
the summer presidential elections had raised concern at the UN Security 
Council: Koumba Yala led the country from 2000 until September 2003 when 
he was ousted in a bloodless coup. According to the constitution he was 
banned from returning to politics for five years following his deposition. He is 
known for his unconventional ways to make himself heard. This time he an-
nounced that he would take the presidency on his own, should he be not al-
lowed to run.  
 The third key player in the June-July presidential elections was another 
ex-president, Malam Bacai Sanha of the post-independence PAIGC (Partido 
Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde - African Party for the Inde-
pendence of Guinea and Cape Verde).  
 The elections were supposed to mark the end of the transitional period 
that had started with the military’s intervention in 2003, ousting Koumba Yala 
and appointing Henrique Rosa as Interim President. Rosa´s duty was it to 
organize parliamentary elections in 2004 and presidential elections before 
May 2005. The international community was generously supporting the or-
ganization of the electoral process but had made clear beforehand that a le-
gitimate government in place was the prerequisite of any additional financial 
O 
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and technical assistance to Guinea Bissau.1 Therefore a comparatively large 
amount of national and international attention was focused on the elections in 
this small country. The main candidates and the past months´ events can be 
understood only when put in perspective with the country’s recent history.  
 
  
Recent history, main candidates and political forces in the 2005 
elections  
 
PAIGC was the party that ruled the country from independence in 1973/1974 
to 2000. It was founded by Amilcar Cabral. At the time when PAIGC was still 
a socialist party, it tried to reduce the political instrumentalization of ethnic 
identity and tension that the Portuguese had so much relied upon by system-
atically replacing village chiefs’ authority (the so-called “régulos”), with vil-
lage committees, the Comités de Tabancas. PAIGC was, according to the consti-
tution, until 1991 the only recognized political force in the country. Still today, 
it is omnipresent in the political arena as a powerful machine. Most people in 
today’s politics have passed through PAIGC one way or another.  
 PAIGC’s first crisis came about in 1986 with the Acontecimentos de 17 de 
Outubro, the events of 17 October, when, following an alleged conspiracy, the 
president at that time, Nino Vieira, ordered the killing of key figures of 
PAIGC, Paulo Correia and Viriato Pan, as well as several military. Most of 
them were Balanta, the ethnic group that is still the most prominent in the 
country and in the military. The next blow for PAIGC came in 1991 when 
Nino Vieira, still the PAIGC president, agreed to open the country to a multi-
party democracy, leading to serious internal divisions between the party’s 
reformers and hardliners. Consequently, the first parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections were held in 1994. PAIGC gained only 62 of the 102 seats in par-
liament, and Nino Vieira won the run-off elections with 52 % against Koumba 
Yala. These elections marked the re-introduction of ethnicity as a major force 
in Guinea’s politics.  
 By June 1998 Nino Vieira’s style of government was marked by clientel-
ism, corruption, a lack of concern for the population’s well-being and eco-
nomic stagnation. Nino Vieira, a general himself, grossly overestimated its 
own popularity when he decided to dismiss the army’s chief of staff, Ansu-
mane Mané, causing a rebellion within the armed forces and taking the con-
flict to the streets of Bissau. Vieira asked for military support from Senegal 
and Guinea Conakry, but after one year of military siege and physical and 
                                                 
1   cf.: ‘Multimillion Dollar Funds for Guinea Bissau as Countries Pledged to Support the 
Presidential Election’, The Independent (Banjul) 21 February 2005 posted on the web 22 Feb-
ruary 2005. 
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moral destruction of the capital Bissau, he took refuge in Portugal, where he 
lived in exile until his return in April 2005.  
 The years following the war were marked by rapidly changing govern-
ments and instability. The ousted Ansumane Mané headed a Military Junta 
that later nominated Malam Bacai Sanha Interim President in order to prepare 
elections in 1999/2000. At that time the prestige of PAIGC was at its all time 
low. Whereas PAIGC came in only third in these elections, Koumba Yala and 
his PRS2 became the country’s first political force. Koumba Yala’s term in of-
fice was marked by authoritarian rule, a disrespect of the already weak consti-
tutional institutions and an appeal to tribalism. He was deposed by the mili-
tary in 2003 making way for another transitional government under President 
Henrique Rosa with the mandate to organize legislative elections in March 
2004, and presidential elections within eighteen months.  
 In May 2005 the Supreme Court decided to admit a total of thirteen can-
didates for the presidential elections, amongst them Nino Vieira and Koumba 
Yala, both of whom were still banned from holding any political post.3 
Though heavily criticized, the court´s decision went unchallenged and had 
important political implications.  
 PAIGC’s candidate for this year’s election was Malam Bancai Sanha, a 
52-year-old Muslim from the ethnic minority Biafada, from the Quinara re-
gion. He studied in former East Germany and has held important posts 
within PAIGC and the government, including Provincial Governor to Presi-
dent of the Workers Union UNTG, Minister of Information and President of 
the National Assembly and finally Interim President in the years 1999-2000.  
 Nino Vieira, 66, who did not succeed in being nominated PAIGC candi-
date, decided to run as an independent candidate, but he took with him im-
portant strategists from PAIGC, such as Aristides Gomes. This was an impor-
tant change in Guinea Bissauian party structure. Nino’s attributes, as hero of 
the anti-colonial struggle, side by side with Amilcar Cabral, as founder of 
PAIGC and a military general, his inherent connection with the shaping of the 
country’s first years of independence, now for the first time were not precisely 
linked to PAIGC’s national party structure. This stirred up voters’ loyalty to 
PAIGC. Nino’s message upon his return from Portugal now was one of na-
tional reconciliation, of a reform of the armed forces, including their re-
                                                 
2  PRS – Partido da Renovação Social (Social Renovation Party). 
3    cf. Kumba Yala y “Nino” Viera présidentiables, Monique Mas, RFI 11/05/2005; Yala was 
granted the right to run on the election after the Supreme Court had declared invalid his 
letter of resignation from the presidency, on the grounds it had been signed under the pres-
sure of a coup d’état. And because his letter of resignation was considered invalid now, 
Koumba Yala decided to occupy the Presidential Palace for a short time on May 25th before 
being evicted, a fact that a few days later he denied to ever have occurred, both the intrusion 
and the eviction. 
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integration into their genuine role in a democratic society. Nino is of Papel 
origin, an ethnic group that lives mostly in Bissau and Biombo.  
 Koumba Yala was the founder of PRS (Partido da Renovacão Social - Party 
for Social Renovation) and was said to have studied philosophy in Portugal 
and political science in RDA. He was the only Balanta candidate, an ethnic 
group that includes roughly 30 % of the population and is important in the 
armed forces.  
 Of all of the candidates of the first round, Malam Bacai Sanha, Nino 
Vieira and Koumba Yala taken together obtained 89,32 % of all votes. All 
other candidates gained only a small fraction of votes and that only in certain 
regions (cf. Table 2, annex). That applied even to popular names like Fran-
cisco Fadul, a former Prime Minister under the transitional government fol-
lowing the 1998-1999 war. The only woman candidate, Antoineta Rosa Go-
mes, came in second to last with 0,37 %. 
 
 
Electoral campaign 
 
According to Guinean election law, there are fifteen days of electoral cam-
paigning preceding a silent day and election day.  
 The electoral campaign of the three main contenders relied on visibility 
of strength expressed in numbers of supporters, not in arguments. Malam 
Bacai Sanha and Nino Vieira used trucks to drive around large numbers of 
chanting and dancing young people, dressed in t-shirts depicting their favor-
ite candidate. Both candidates also used donations of rural tools, motorcycles 
and cellular phones in an attempt to influence people’s voting decision.  
 Three radio and TV debates between three and four different candidates 
consisted mostly of each candidate’s announcing his own experience and 
voicing his opinions rather than arguing about issues. In addition, the Gov-
ernment decreed that the radio and TV stations had to provide free air time to 
all candidates in order to publish their programs and make them known to 
the public. But no reimbursement of campaign costs was planned by the Gov-
ernment4. This is why the smaller parties did not seem to be able to mobilize 
sufficient funds to show their presence, but rather relied on door to door 
campaigning. In that way there was a direct relation between money invested 
in campaigning and scores in the election results, even though, obviously, 
more criteria came into play. Also, the candidates chose carefully where to 
campaign, notably in their major constituency, as was the case for Aregado 
Manteque in Cacheu. In the second round the candidates chose neighbor-
hoods for their generally impressive campaign presence where they perceived 
                                                 
4   This measure contributed to limiting the number of candidates who would run only in 
order to receive a reimbursement of campaign costs.  
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they would need to show off most in order to convince the still undecided. 
The results of the first round are presented in table 2 (cf. annex).  
 On 24 June, a few days after the publication of these results, a demon-
stration by supporters of PRS in downtown Bissau was dispersed by the po-
lice with live ammunition, which resulted in bloodshed5. The objective of the 
demonstration was not all clear, but it happened in the context of Koumba 
Yala’s contention that Malam Bacai Sanha and Nino Vieira had not come in 
first and second, but rather him. These unfortunate events underlined Nino 
Vieira’s arguments, that the government could only resort to brute force and 
that against Balanta, thus diverting attention from the fact that he himself had 
been accused of killing Balanta following the Acontecimentos de 17 de Outubro 
1986, an occurrence many Balanta cannot forgive and which would keep them 
from voting in Nino’s favor.  
 A few days later all three candidates, Malam Bacai Sanha, Nino Vieira 
and Koumba Yala met with Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade in Dakar. 
There were rumors about rather large sums of money changing hands.   
 What followed were negotiations among all parties and candidates, with 
the result that Nino Vieira united the support of almost all candidates of the 
first round of elections, including the important players Koumba Yala and 
Francisco Fadul, whereas PAIGC’s Malam Bacai was left with only small sup-
port. Several parties seemed to break up in different factions between those 
supporting openly the announced course and others that rather supported the 
other candidate.  
 On 15 July there were several attacks on police and military installations 
in Bissau. One policeman on guard duty was killed in the process. According 
to RFI6 a total of four attacks took place at the same time7. Investigations by 
the authorities were slow, and the tendency to downplay the events became 
clear. Rumors spread that these were acts of revenge from the families of the 
dead of the 24 June demonstration. Others assumed an attempt to get back a 
suitcase with money that had been confiscated some days earlier at the airport 
from an entrepreneur who supported Nino.  
 As the second election day approached, the campaign language became 
more insulting and even less content was transmitted.8 In several incidents 
violence broke out between followers of the two candidates, stones were 
thrown, people were hurt and one truck´s windshield smashed, the mounted 
                                                 
5   Some say 2 to 3 PRS supporters and one policeman were killed; others claim the victims 
were by-standers.  
6   RFI - Radio France International. 
7   Tentative de putsch ou « incident isolé », Monique Mas, RFI 17/07/2005. 
8   Just like in previous elections, Malam Bacai Sanha was depicted as a cow, a play on words 
with his name (vaca meaning “cow” in Portuguese sounds just like Baca).The same went for 
the Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr. Or candidates were characterized as suffering from 
cholera and HIV/AIDS). 
Nuno Vaz  / Iris Cordelia Rotzoll 
 
540 
 
sound system was destroyed. Only very clear statements made by police and 
transmitted time and time again by radio and TV, calmed down the situation. 
On the last campaign day, 22 July, an overwhelming demonstration of sup-
port in the streets of Bissau could be evidenced, unprecedented in Guinea 
Bissauian history. Thousand and thousands of followers were lining the main 
street leading from the airport into the city center, waiting for their candidates 
to come back from the interior where they had been campaigning in the past 
days. Even though Nino Vieira with Koumba Yala and Francisco Fadul came 
in only short time before Malam Bacai Sanha, there was no confrontation be-
tween the people from the different factions.  
 The voting on the following Sunday 24 July was a lot less conflictive than 
expected by many. Logistics were the same as a month before; counting and 
tabulation were made much easier by having only two candidates running. In 
a large majority of the polling stations there were party agents present 
throughout the day. Also during the regional consolidation the presence of 
party agents from both candidates was widespread. Likewise EU observers 
and party agents were present at all stages of the regional consolidation and 
digitalization. The results of the second round were the following: 
 
 
Table 1: Results of second round of Guinean Presidential Elections 2005 
  (by candidate and regions) 
 
Region Candidate votes TOTAL 
J. B. Vieira 58.482 (49.86%) Bissau M. B. Sanha 58.818 (50.14%) 117.300 
J. B. Vieira 14.091 Tombali M. B. Sanha 11.045 25.136 
J. B. Vieira 6.608 Quinara M. B. Sanha 10.437 17.045 
J. B. Vieira 27.432 Oio M. B. Sanha 31.570 59.002 
J. B. Vieira 24.034 Biombo M. B. Sanha 3.014 27.048 
J. B. Vieira 7.901 Bilama M. B. Sanha 3.641 11.542 
J. B. Vieira 28.189 Bafata M. B. Sanha 28.601 56.790 
J. B. Vieira 29.920 Gabú M. B. Sanha 28.166 58.086 
J. B. Vieira 19.510  Cacheu M. B. Sanha 21.467  40.977 
J. B. Vieira 52.35% % Total M. B. Sanha 47.65% 100.00% 
 
           Source: CNE, Bissau, Departamento de Estatìstica e Informatica, Julho 14, 2005 
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On 19 August, and more than a week later than prescribed by law, the Co-
missão Nacional de Eleições (National Electoral Commission) announced the 
official results, Nino Vieira won with 52,35 %, Malam Bacai Sanha was de-
feated with 47,65 %. The same day PAIGC submitted a complaint to the Su-
preme Court pointing out irregularities and demanding a recount in Bissau 
and in the Biombo region.  
 
 
The importance of ethnic voting in Guinea-Bissau’s political culture 
 
The ethnic card was too much of a temptation not to be played by the candi-
dates in this country with its distinct ethnic differences. Generally people tend 
to vote for the candidate of their own ethnic group. 
 Koumba Yala put all his political chances into courting the Balanta vote. 
But the two other strong candidates, Nino Vieira and Malam Bacai Sanha, had 
to make compromises, as both were part of a ethnic minority, Papel and 
Biafada respectively. In the first round, Koumba Yala united only the large 
majority of the Balanta vote, and did not get enough votes to make it to the 
second round. Nevertheless this did put him in a rather privileged position 
when negotiating with the candidates of the second round. Finally he an-
nounced his support for Nino Vieira. Even though this made it more likely 
that Nino would win, at this stage it was nevertheless far from being predict-
able, because neither it was clear that all the Balanta would follow Koumba 
Yala’s voting intention, nor everybody in Guinea Bissau who accepts gifts 
ends up voting for the candidate connected to the gifts received.  
 When analyzing the electoral behaviour in Guinea-Bissau, it should be 
kept in mind that the “ethnic vote” is often bought. Regional and local leaders 
based on ethnicity are open for persuasion from candidates, and the decision 
to vote is often a collective one, decided in accordance with local power struc-
tures, in which money or goods change hands. Especially in rural areas, once 
the leader decides where his vote will go, the community is likely to follow. 
Consequently, the one who invests most will be rewarded by a favourable 
electoral result. 
  Another ethnic group heavily courted was the Fula, one of the largest 
ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau. The Fula vote was as important as unpredict-
able: Some say that the true socio-cultural difference in today’s Guinea Bissau 
is between Islamized9 and non-Islamized groups of population, and that Fula, 
Mandinga and Biafada might use the ethnic card more explicitly in their fu-
ture political strategies. This would explain the Balanta behaviour in these 
                                                 
9    Islamized in the sense that Muslims in Guinea-Bissau do not fit in the common notion 
existing in Western society. Islam in Guinea-Bissau is much more mitigated and blended 
with local practices (cf.: Nóbrega, A. A luta pelo poder na Guiné-Bissau ISCSP Lisboa, 2003 pp.).  
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elections. The Balanta are primarily Animists and thus more easily support 
the Christian Nino Vieira than the Muslim Malam Bacai Sanha. Additionally, 
Malam Bacai Sanha failed to obtain the Muslim vote as such. This was proba-
bly a result of the historic hostility between the Fula and the Mandinga: in-
stead of opting for a Muslim candidate, the Fula refrained from voting for a 
Biafada - Mandinga candidate. In this case, in terms of incidence of social 
identity in electoral behavior, ethnic solidarity and donations turned out to be 
more relevant than religious affiliation. 
 
 
The role of the international community and the electoral observa-
tion effort 
 
Far from being a comprehensive analysis of all observation missions of the 
presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau, this is primarily an outline of the ef-
forts of different actors willing to contribute to stability and democracy in 
Guinea-Bissau, as well as a portrayal of the intentions and motivations behind 
some of these efforts.  
 There were observation missions from six institutions, from the United 
Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union10 (EU); the Com-
munity of Portuguese Speaking Countries11 (CPLP); the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS), and from the United States Embassy 
in Dakar. They differed in the financial and human resources available to 
them and in their level of experience. No national election observers were 
admitted. 
 The first objective of all the missions was to show that the international 
community was concerned and paying special attention to the recent political 
events in the country, not only because of the internal crisis itself, but also 
because of the possible spilling over effect in the overall context of the West 
African region. At the same time their presence put political pressure on the 
parties and candidates to respect the election results no matter who won. The 
second objective was to promote human rights, to stabilize democratization 
efforts, and to build local capacity to conduct free and transparent elections. 
Furthermore it was understood by many Guineans that if the elections were 
organized in a transparent manner, the international community would honor 
this commitment by increasing current levels of aid or investment. 
 All the electoral observation missions except the European Union Elec-
tion Observation Mission (EU EOM) operated under the UN umbrella. 
UNOGBIS, the United Nations´ Peace-Building Office for Guinea Bissau, had 
the mandate to coordinate the international donors´ support for the organiza-
                                                 
10     http://www.eueomgbissau.org/ 
11    httt://www.cplp.org 
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tion of the elections, and, as such, the different observation missions in the 
country. The EU´s decision to opt for a more independent approach was due 
to EU´s general observation procedure and methodology applied in all coun-
tries where there are EOMs deployed. The EU generally signs a memorandum 
of understanding with the host government that outlines exactly the rights 
and obligations of the mission and the observers. The other five observer or-
ganizations at first did not appreciate the EU approach, insisting that the ob-
servation should be complementary and required a lot of coordination. At the 
end, though, all recognized the suitability of the EU´s decision. UNOGBIS did 
not have sufficient resources to assume the role most expected it to assume, 
namely to take charge of the observation process, appoint specific tasks to 
observers, and to collect, process and analyze information observed. This is 
why at the end each organization had to organize its own work. This ulti-
mately proved to be quite difficult. CPLP observers, for example, were not 
given sufficient means of communication and transportation in the first 
round, obviously limiting the scope of the observation capacity of the team, 
whereas the methodology followed in all EU Electoral Observation Missions 
is to set up their own transportation and communication capacity and data 
analysis system. This makes possible a fluent contact between the field and 
the Core Team in the capital, and enables the mission to follow up in a timely 
manner the opening of the polling stations, the voting and the counting of the 
ballots at all levels. 
 As far as the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community (CPLP) was 
concerned, all corresponding member-states took part in the mission, except 
Guinea-Bissau, the host country. It was not the first time CPLP participated in 
an electoral observation, and this time it turned out rather successfully, lead-
ing CPLP to a more solid recognition by the international community as a 
group based on linguistic criteria. In spite of the above-mentioned lack of lo-
gistical resources, not due to a lack of funding, a good coordination was 
achieved between CPLP, UNOGBIS, and all the other election observation 
missions.  
 The final declarations issued after both rounds were written and agreed 
upon by all organizations working under the UN umbrella, and were an-
nounced by the CPLP Chief of Mission, the representative from São Tomé e 
Príncipe, a fact that gave CPLP a considerable degree of visibility. The pres-
ence of a representative from East-Timor was also very welcomed, a fact 
President Henrique Rosa specially underlined in a meeting with CPLP ob-
servers that took place after the first round. 
 The International Community present in Bissau was pleased with the 
developing of the electoral process, and urged Guinea-Bissau to keep moving 
in the right direction. The elections were declared fair and transparent by all 
observation missions. In practical terms, the EU issued the most credible 
statement, since its information gathering system and its analysis capability 
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backed its statements, whereas all other missions under the UN umbrella is-
sued a simple two-page-statement where, together, they declared the elec-
tions as free and transparent, but did not present any findings, conclusions or 
recommendation based on observed facts and figures issued from any analy-
sis of data reported on the observation forms. All agreed that the National 
Electoral Commission had done an enormous organizational effort and had 
performed very well.  
 Nevertheless after the announcement of the results, violence broke out in 
the streets of Bissau, mainly due to provocations between Nino Vieira and 
Malam Bacai`s supporters and fuelled by the close vicinity of their headquar-
ters. In a vigorous speech, Malam Bacai Sanha refused to accept the results, 
demanded a recount in two provinces where he expected to have been more 
successful, Bissau and Biombo, and stated that he would never accept defeat. 
In this context, the International Electoral Observation Missions broadened 
their initial mandate to a much more important role by conducting informal 
conflict prevention activities. The presence and the role played by high level 
international observers like the UN General Secretary’s Special Envoy, former 
Mozambique President, Joaquim Chissano, and former Burundi President, 
Pierre Buyoya, contributed in calming down the tension risen. Chissano met 
with politicians and representatives of civil society, as well as with members 
of the armed forces reminding them of their commitment to supporting the 
process of fair and transparent elections. After the rejection of the results by 
Malam Bacai Sanhá, high level observers that were still in the country like-
wise participated in this dialogue in order to contain the situation, rather than 
merely observing the process. 
 Nino Vieira could now easily base his arguments on the final statements 
of the international observation missions. Furthermore he insisted that it was 
precisely the PAIGC government organizing the elections, therefore having a 
much larger opportunity had they wanted to, to commit fraud than anybody 
in the opposition.  
 This underlined the importance of the credibility of any observation mis-
sion’s statements. They should be based on observed facts, statistical and 
measurable information, and not only on simple opinions and impressions. 
 
 
Outlook 
 
A larger difference in the number of votes obtained between the two presi-
dential candidates Nino Vieira and Malam Bacai Sanha would have provided 
more solid institutional conditions for peace and a reconciliation of the 
Guinea-Bissauian society, regardless of who came in first. 
 It can only be speculated which of the two candidates of the second 
round would be more beneficial to the country’s future, but a PAIGC sup-
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ported President would provide, hypothetically, a more stable political envi-
ronment for the regular functioning of the recently elected PAIGC govern-
ment. 
 The military’s position will have to be closely watched, as nothing in 
Guinean politics can be achieved against the will of the military. Given the 
large numbers of Balanta in the military, Nino Vieira will probably be able to 
run a more stable government by controlling and including the military in 
strategic decisions in a more convincing way than his opponent could have 
been able to do. On the other hand, some say there is too much in the past, 
namely the Acontecimentos de 17 de Outubro, that might prevent the institu-
tional coexistence created by the election’s result to last. 
 The international community has an important role to play in the future 
of the country and the region, by keeping watch on the political situation and 
taking an active stand, more than merely financing development. There is an 
urgent need for a ´whistle-blower´ and for effective confidence-building 
measures whenever social peace is threatened by ambitious and unscrupu-
lous politicians, much to the general population’s disadvantage. 
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Annex: 
 
Table 2: Results of first round of Guinean Presidential Elections 2005 (by candidate and regions) 
 
Source: CNE, Bissau, Departamento de Estatìstica e Informatica, June 19, 2005
Region 
Candidate 
Bissau Tombali Quinara Oio Biombo Bolama Bafata Gabú Cacheu Total % Total 
Malam Bacai San-
ha 
50.585 8.384 9.402 26.698 2.019 2.992 22.409 20.340 15.447 158.276 35,45  
João Bernardo 
Vieira 
37.023 4.420 2.047 6.459 19.157 7.636 19.776 24.600 7.800 128.918 28,87 
Koumba Yala 24.407 13.899 6.593 30.725 5.367 472 8.989 5.910 15.244 111.606 25,00 
Francisco J. Fadul 6.544 473 273 871 359 294 895 1.156 1.868 12.733 2,85  
Aregado Man-
tenque 
1.456 182 105 489 216 142 805 734 4.871 9.000 2,02  
Mamadu Iaia 
Djalo 
1.317 588 168 375 84 101 1.526 2.470 483 7.112 1,59 
Total valid votes 446.493 100 % 
votes 127.740 30.990 19.998 72.269 29.871 12.715 62.177 63.393 52.690 471.843 87,63 % 
 
non-voters 16.276 5.270 2.614 8.261 2.643 2.243 8.826 9.120 11.375 66.628 12,37 % 
voters registered 144.016 36.260 22.612 80.530 32.514 14.958 71.003 72.513 64.065 538.471 100,00 % 
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